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OPERATIONAL RISK IN BASEL II
MICHAEL E. BLEIER'
The Basel Capital Accord2 (Accord or Basel I) is a fairly
complex quantitative driven method for determining regulatory
capital. The current state of the Accord has followed a long and
tortuous path since January 16, 2001, when the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision released its second consultative document on
the New Basel Capital Accord (New Accord or Basel II).' This
followed the initial indication in June 1999 that a new risk-sensitive
capital accord was necessary, supplanting Basel I which has been in
place since 1988. The January 2001 Basel proposal was originally
intended to be finalized by year-end 2001 with an effective date of
2004. Those final dates have been extended to mid-2004 with
implementation hoped for by the end of 2006.4 A third consultative
document was issued in April 2003,' and the U.S. bank regulators
1. General Counsel and Executive Vice President of Mellon Financial
Corporation and Mellon Bank, N.A., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Mr. Bleier has been
General Counsel since 1992. Before joining Mellon in 1982, he served as Assistant
General Counsel of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in
Washington, DC., from 1971 to 1982. Mr. Bleier also served as Chairman of the
Lawyers Council of the Financial Services Roundtable from 1994 to 1998. Mr. Bleier
received his JD from Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, D.C. and
his BA from the University of Tulsa, in Tulsa, Oklahoma. This article is based on a
manuscript delivered at the November 6-7, 2003, meeting of the Banking Law
Committee of the American Bar Association by Mr. Bleier.
2. See generally BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (1988), http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs04A.pdf [hereinafter BASEL I].
3. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMENTS, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
(2001), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca03.pdf [hereinafter SECOND CONSULTATIVE
DOCUMENT].
4. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMMITTEE, THE NEW
BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD (Jan. 15, 2004), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm.
5. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMENTS, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
(2003), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/cp3full.pdf [hereinafter THIRD CONSULTATIVE
DOCUMENT].
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have issued their Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR),
for which the comment period expired on November 3, 2003.6
After setting out the general framework of Basel II, this
Article will focus on the new additional capital charge for operational
risk, currently not part of the Basel I framework. Parts II and III will
discuss the proposed Basel II approaches to measuring operational
risk and concerns the proposals raise for U.S. banks. Part IV
concludes.
I. BASEL II GENERAL FRAMEWORK
In contrast to the 1988 Accord which applied to all banks in
the U.S., it was decided that a more risk-sensitive capital approach to
regulatory capital was necessary. Instead of the flat basket eight
percent capital charge under Basel I, the New Accord has three
components:
" Pillar One is a minimum regulatory capital charge for
credit risk and for the first time a separate capital charge
for operational risk. There is also included a new internal
risk-based (IRB) approach. Under Basel II, as a general
matter, the capital charge for the credit exposure for an
institution meeting the advanced-IRB treatment
requirements should decrease considerably below the
eight percent level under Basel I. Thus, institutions
qualifying for advanced credit treatment will be
competitively advantaged (through a lower risk-based
capital charge) than those institutions operating under
Basel . 7
" Pillar Two focuses on supervisory review which basically
is intended to allow examiners to focus on overall risk
management techniques and internal controls.8
6. Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 45900-01 (Aug. 4,
2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Press/bcreg/2003/
20030804/attachment.pdf.
7. See generally THIRD CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 5, at 6-137.
8. See generally THIRD CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 5, at 138-153.
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Pillar Three recognizes that market discipline has the
potential to reinforce capital regulation and other
supervisory efforts to ensure the safety and soundness of
the banking system. Thus, Pillar Three involves a wide
range of disclosure initiatives, which are designed to make
the risk in the capital positions of a bank or its parent
holding company more transparent.9
II. OPERATIONAL RISK
Operational risk is not now captured in U.S. or international
capital standards although some banks impose the charge for that
kind of risk in their internal economic risk models. Under Basel II,
operational risk is defined broadly as "the risk of [direct or indirect]
loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people
and systems or from external events."'"
The regulators recognized in Basel I that institutions were
exposed to non-credit-related risks, which included operational risk.
Thus, they built a "buffer" into the general risk-based capital rules to
cover those other risks that one might argue is found in the broad-
based 5% well-capitalized leverage requirement." Logically this
"buffer" should disappear with the creation of a specific capital
charge for operational risk, but it is being retained by U.S. banking
regulators.'2 The same organizations also remain subject to the
prompt corrective action legislation and implementing regulations. 3
The new capital requirement for operational risk can be fairly
expensive for specialized financial institutions with significant
concentration in asset management, custody, and other businesses
that would, for the first time carry a capital requirement. Such a
capital charge would disadvantage the more successful specialized
9. See generally id. at 154-168.
10. Id. at 120.
11. Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. at 45902.
12. Id. Well-capitalized: 10% total Risk-Based Capital ratio, 6% Tier One ratio
and 5% leverage ratio. Id. at n. 4.
13. Id.; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (2000).
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institutions because of their greater gross income, which is probably
due to good controls, systems and marketplace recognition.
A. Basel's Three Approaches for Measuring Operational Risk
There are three approaches to calculating operational risk
under Basel II, but only one approach under what the U.S. regulators
will apply according to the ANPR. The three approaches can be used
by non-U.S. organizations subject to these rules, but in the U.S. only
the third approach can be used and only by "core banks" and those
who choose to opt-in."n
Basic Indicator Approach: An example of this approach
uses gross income as a proxy for the organization's
operational risk exposure. This is calculated by
multiplying a particular bank's average annual gross
income over the previous three years by 15%.15
Standardized Approach: This approach divides an
organization's activities into standardized business units
(i.e., investment banking, banking and others) and various
lines of business: (i) corporate finance, (ii) trading and
sales, (iii) retail banking, (iv) commercial banking, (v)
payment and settlement, (vi) retail brokerage, (vii) agency
services, and (viii) asset management. Risk indicators
(from 12% to 18%) are established for each line of
business to serve as the proxy for operational risk. The
required capital under this approach is determined by
multiplying the gross income (or for asset management,
total funds under management) by a factor determined by
industry loss experience for the given line of business.
The total operational risk capital charge for the
14. See THIRD CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 5, at 120; Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. at 45902.
15. THIRD CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 5, at 121. The fixed
percentage was 30% under the first Basel II proposal. BASEL COMMITTEE ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTrLEMENTS, CONSULTATIVE
DOCUMENT: OPERATIONAL RISK (2001), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca07.pdf.
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organization is the sum of all capital charges for each of
the lines of business.
16
Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA): This
approach allows banks more input into determining their
operational risk capital charge, as their capital charge will
be based on internally developed models. 7 This is the
only operational risk approach proposed by U.S.
regulators in the ANPR, which must be accompanied on
the credit side by using the Advanced-IRB treatment. 8
Both measurements require examiner overview and sign-
off.
19
The AMA is designed to allow each financial institution to
use its own methodology for assessing its exposure to operational
risk, provided it is comprehensive and results in a capital charge that
is reflective of the operational risk experience of the organization."z
This means one estimates the potential operational losses that the
banking institution faces at a soundness standard of 99.9%
confidence level over a one-year period (a once in a millennium
event).2' The operational risk exposure would be multiplied by 12.5
to determine a risk-weighted assets equivalent, which is added to the
amounts for credit and market risk for the denominator of the
regulatory capital ratio.22 Institutions eligible to use the AMA
approach are the "core banks": banks that have total banking and
thrift assets of $250 billion or more or have a total on-balance-sheet
foreign exposure of $10 billion or more.23 The second group are
those who choose voluntarily to subject themselves to these charges
as "opt-in banks., 24 The third group is all the other banks and thrifts
16. THIRD CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 5, at 122-23.
17. Id. at 123-30.
18. Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. at 45902.
19. See 68 Fed. Reg. at 45902.
20. Id. at 45904; see also THIRD CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 5, at 125-130.
21. 68 Fed. Reg. at 45902.
22. Id. 12.5 is the reciprocal of the 8% minimum risk-based capital charge. Id.
23. Id. at 45906.
24. Id.
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who would remain subject to Basel I and not incur a separate
operational risk capital charge.25
Once a bank becomes a core bank it remains subject to the
advanced approaches going forward.26  If it drops below the
thresholds it still remains a core bank unless it can show it has
permanently downsized.27 The U.S. regulatory agencies propose an
annual test.2 8 If the bank approaches the thresholds the agencies will
have a dialogue with the bank "to ensure that appropriate practices
are in place or are actively being developed to prepare the
organization for implementation of the advanced approaches."29
B. FRB Policy Statement
In 1999, the Federal Reserve adopted Supervisory Policy
Statement 99-18 in which examiners were directed to ensure that
each institution has a rigorous and comprehensive internal process
for evaluating its own capital adequacy to meet formal regulatory
standards but also sufficient to support their underlying risk
positions.31 The ANPR and Basel II expand on 99-18 to require
specific action steps, which also include greater board and senior
management oversight, to use the AMA and an independent
operational risk management function, which must submit quarterly
reports to the board of directors.3'
25. Id. at 45907.




30. Letter Assessing Capital Adequacy in Relation to Risk at Large Banking
Organizations and Others with Complex Risk Profiles (SR 99-18) from the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System to the Officer in Charge of Supervision and
Appropriate Supervisory and Examination Staff at Each Federal Reserve Bank and
Certain Domestic Banking Organizations Supervised by the Federal Reserve (July 1,




III. WHAT ARE SOME OF THE CONCERNS ABOUT OPERATIONAL
RISK?
A. Definitional Problem
Since proposing operational risk, there have been ongoing
difficulties in defining operational risk. This definitional problem has
been recognized and acknowledged by the Basel Committee in its
public comments as well as by Jerry Hawke, the Comptroller of the
Currency, and the Federal Reserve Banks of Chicago, Richmond and
San Francisco.3" All question whether operational risk can be
accurately defined or effectively offset by a regulatory capital charge.
Jerry Hawke, for example, said, "[a] one-size-fits-all approach to
operational risk... while simple to apply, would disadvantage the
best managed banks and provide undeserved advantage to the worst
managed. Worst of all, it would provide no incentive to improve
internal control systems."33 Of course, having excessive capital can
impair financial performance and impact competitiveness.
The ANPR and Basel II attempt to treat operational risk
under a model more suited to credit risk. The proposal, by focusing
primarily on regulatory capital,34 shifts attention and resources away
from critical risk management efforts, and creates perverse incentives
to avoid investment in important operational risk infrastructure,
processes, and people. As must be recognized, a 9/11-type risk (such
as bio-terror or a nuclear blast) makes capital irrelevant.
Contingency planning, disaster preparedness, back-up facilities and
32. See, e.g., Letter from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago to the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements at 10 (May
31, 2001), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ca/ferebkofch.pdf; Letter from the Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond to the Basel Committee Secretariat, Bank for International
Settlements at 2-3 (May 30, 2001), http://www.bis.orglbcbs/ca/ferebkofri.pdf; FRBSF
Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Board of San Francisco at 4 (Jan. 25, 2002),
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2002/el2OO2-02.pdf.
33. John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks before the
Institute of International Bankers 9 (Mar. 4, 2002), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2002-17a.doc.
34. As opposed to economic capital, which "is often used to refer to the amount
of capital that should be allocated to an activity according to the results of such an
exercise." 68 Fed. Reg. at 45902.
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redundancies limited losses from 9/11. 3" The AMA approach does
not fully recognize and account for these risk mitigation efforts in
part because there is no accepted method to define or measure
operational risk.
On October 11, 2003 the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision announced that it will separate out the treatment of
expected loss and unexpected loss, with the resulting IRB proposal
being a measurement of risk-weighted assets based solely on the
unexpected loss portion of the IRB calculation.36 This means
significant reliance on external loss data experiences. Tied in with
this approach is the requirement that if there is a shortfall in coverage
where the expected or actual loss exceeds the provision, there is a
deduction of the shortfall in equal amounts from Tier One and Tier
Two capital.37 If there is an excess, the overage is added to Tier Two,
but this amount cannot exceed 20% of Tier Two capital.38
Operational risk can include costs necessary to fix systems
problems, payments to third parties, write-downs, decisions to absorb
losses to maintain ongoing client relationships, near misses, late losses
or contingent losses. Theoretically, operational risk should only be
for unexpected losses, since provisions are covering expected losses.
However, it is often difficult for banks to hold reserves against
unexpected operational losses; moreover, in some countries,
including the U.S., accounting rules make it very difficult for banks to
hold reserves related to operational events that have yet to occur.
The banking community must wait to see how the SEC, which has
long pushed for lower loan loss reserves, will treat the new
operational risk capital rules. In any event, the SEC is not likely to
raise an accounting challenge to explicit capital standards imposed by
regulation.39
35. Letter from Karen Petrou, Executive Director, Financial Guardian Group, to the
Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Comptroller of the
Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision (Nov. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Karen Petrou
Letter], available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/03CFGG.html.
36. Press Release, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel II: Significant
Progress on Major Issues (Oct. 11, 2003), http://www.bis.org/press/p031O11.htm. The
comment period closed on December 31, 2003. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Karen Petrou Letter, supra note 35.
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Many types of what might be called unanticipated operational
losses, such as credit card fraud, are accounted for through end of
quarter adjustments to loss provisions instead of through an ongoing
capital charge. In that case, the bank would have to disclose its
methodology and its adjustments would have to reflect the unexpected
as well as experienced losses. These operational losses are really
viewed as a cost of doing business, included on the profit and loss
statement and covered by the ongoing and consistent fee revenue
stream and recurring earnings of an institution. Thus, operational risk
is really an earnings at risk issue, not a capital at risk issue.
B. Collection of Loss Data
Another major problem is the Basel II-required internal
assembly or accumulation of up to five years of internal operational
risk loss data across all material business lines, events, product types
and geographic locations.4" The types of loss event data that should
be collected include:
* Internal and external fraud;
* Employment practices and workplace safety;
* Client, products and business practices (includes
fiduciary);
* Damage to physical assets;
* Business disruption and system failures; and
* Execution, delivery, and process management i.e.,
failed transaction processing.4'
The accumulation of this data for regulatory purposes may
subject banks to greater exposure in litigation as such data could create
40. THIRD CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 5, at 127.
41. Id. at 202 (Annex 7).
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a road map for the plaintiff's bar. Because of the chilling effect of such
potential exposure, candid internal risk assessment may be
jeopardized. In addition, there will be reluctance to share loss data on
an industry-wide basis particularly where there is no assurance that
such sensitive data can be protected. Also, competitive risk exists in
such external databases. Nevertheless, without an appropriate industry
loss database, it is hard to visualize how the regulators can go forward
on the loss data issue. It should be noted that a lot of the loss data may
be irrelevant if banks can absorb the loss as part of their cost of doing
business.
C. Inconsistent National Supervisory Treatment
There is a valid concern that the operational risk components
may be applied inconsistently across national jurisdictions. As has
often been noted by Jerry Hawke, U.S. banks operate in a far different,
in many ways stricter, regulatory environment than non-U.S.
competitors.42 For example, the common use by U.S. regulators of on-
site examination teams is simply not the practice in most other
jurisdictions. In addition, the U.S. proposal to retain both the leverage
ratio and prompt corrective action regime for U.S. banks operating
under the New Accord creates additional capital demands on U.S.
banks. As a result, any additional capital requirement for U.S. banks,
including the operational risk requirement, will have a greater impact
on U.S. banks than banks operating in other national jurisdictions.
D. Undue Reliance on External Data
"Under the ANPR, the AMA continues to rely too heavily
on... external data. External data provides valuable information for
42. The New Basel Accord - In Search of a Unified U.S. Position: Hearing Before
the House Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Comm. On Fin.
Services, 108th Cong. 11-12 (June 19, 2003) (testimony of John D. Hawke, Jr.,
Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency),
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/061903jh.pdf; The New Basel Accord -
Sound Regulation or Crushing Complexity?: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. On
Domestic and Int'l Monetary Policy, Trade and Tech. of the Comm. On Fin. Services,
108th Cong. 13-14 (Feb. 27, 2003) (testimony of John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of




qualitative reviews of an institution's risk management systems and




scaling external data to make it relevant to a bank's
risk profile, system of internal controls, and other risk
management factors is a difficult and uncertain
process. Moreover, the integrity, completeness, and
general data quality of external databases are often
questionable and difficult to ascertain and control.
Much publicly available operational loss data is based
on relatively extreme risk management failures.
Mandating the use of such data risks imposing capital
requirements based on the "lowest common
denominator" of risk management practices-an
approach that would penalize banks with well-
developed control systems, and low losses. Sharing
such data between institutions, or other third parties,
as noted above, will also raise serious privacy,
confidentiality, legal, and competitive issues.44
E. Indirect Loss Data
The bank regulatory agencies "specifically solicited comment
regarding the possible inclusion of the risk of indirect losses, such as
opportunity cost, in the definition of operational risk .... First,
quantifying the risk of such losses, and converting that risk to a capital
requirement, will be next to impossible. Second, such indirect losses
are far more related to a bank's business plan than its risk management
function, and should continue to be appropriately accounted for in a
bank's income statement, not its regulatory capital requirements.,
45
43. Letter from David Spina, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, State Street
Corporation, to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Coporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and
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Moreover, strategic risk is excluded from operational risk.46 What
about a business decision to forego a particular line of business because
of an ultimately unwise management decision? How do you
determine the revenue that was forgone and the capital charge against
it? What about an alternative strategy? Does that trigger a capital
charge? The profit and loss statement appropriately encompasses
these kinds of business decisions and judgments. This really lies within
the "business judgment" rule, not a capital rule.47
F. Treatment of Legal Risk
"While legal risk is certainly a factor in an institution's risk
profile, such risks are among the most difficult to quantify for
purposes of a Pillar One capital requirement." 48 This type of risk
includes the risk resulting from tort liability, securities suitability
standards, and the laws against loan and employment discrimination
- among many others. These same legal standards, of course, do not
apply in many other nations.,
49  _
Why would U.S. regulators "agree to a capital charge for U.S.
banking institutions arising from laws and regulations unique to the
U.S. that are designed to achieve our own social objectives-especially
given the unique U.S. requirement for reserves against material legal
risk. In addition, these are laws which have no known bearing on any
bank's failure." 50  Further, reputation risk is specifically excluded
from the definition. 1
In cases where a bank may be subject to legal risk, securities
law requires full disclosure of material matters, thus the operational
risk proposal would have no new impact on market discipline.
Moreover, litigation loss history provides limited insights into future
losses, creating significant challenges to modeling. Since legal losses
46. THIRD CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 5, at 120.
47. Karen Petrou Letter, supra note 35.
48. Spina Letter, supra note 43.
49. A Review of the New Basel Capital Accord: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (June 18, 2003) (testimony of






are typically closely linked to individual events and circumstances, the
use of external data is particularly inappropriate for legal risk. Finally,
the U.S. legal system poses the highest litigation risk of any G-10
country. A stark example is that two large U.S. banks have been sued
for their asserted participation in the slave trade - over 200 years ago.
As a result, U.S. banks will likely be required to set aside more capital
for litigation risk than their foreign competitors. This could result in a
significant competitive disadvantage for U.S. banks.52
G. Insurance
Legal risk is unique in that the initial estimated exposure is
often not resolved for many years. Yet, insurance is a widely
accepted and fairly successful mitigant for this type of risk.
Nevertheless, under Basel II and the ANPR insurance must be
capital-like to provide the necessary cushion.53 The insurance must
have the following characteristics: (i) be provided by a nonaffiliate
with a minimum claims paying ability rating of A; (ii) have an initial
term of no less than one year; (iii) not contain an exclusion for
regulatory actions; (iv) have clear cancellation and nonrenewal notice
periods; and (v) have coverage that has been explicitly mapped to
actual operational risk exposure.54 Also, the bank regulatory
agencies should eliminate the proposed 20 percent limit on
reductions in the AMA capital calculation for insurance as a mitigant.
This 20% cap does not appear to have any analytical or statistical
basis. In fact, insurance can provide far more leverage than capital in
addressing the low frequency, high severity loss events which may
exceed an institution's ability to cover with earnings. Imposing a
specific regulatory cap of 20%, or any other percentage, will create a
disincentive for banks to hold insurance, will stifle innovation in new
insurance-related (and other) risk management products, and will
greatly reduce the risk sensitivity of the proposed New Accord.
52. Karen Petrou Letter, supra note 35.
53. THIRD CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 5, at 129-30; Advanced Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. at 45943.
54. THIRD CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 5, at 129-30.
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H. Alternative Approach for Primarily Fee-Based Services
While the credit risk benefits of the New Accord may offset
the negative impact of the new operational risk requirement for
banks engaged in traditional lending activities, the opposite is true for
banks primarily providing fee-based services, such as investment
servicing and asset management. For banks engaged primarily in fee-
based service businesses, the New Accord and the ANPR impose an
additional capital requirement, largely through the operational risk
requirement, while leaving their competitors, (i.e., investment
management firms, broker-dealers, insurance companies, investment
banks, mutual funds, leasing companies and business services and
software companies) with no capital requirement for operational risk.
The result is a marketplace distortion, creating a regulatory incentive
for banking organizations to move activities outside the reach of
Basel 11.5
An alternative that has been proposed to the Pillar One
capital requirement is a rigorous Pillar Two supervisory approach.56
Placing operational risk management under Pillar Two would allow
the agencies to impose strict operational risk regulatory
requirements, including requirements related to capital adequacy,
without creating the negative competitive and technical impacts of a
Pillar One requirement.57
Absent the adoption of a Pillar Two approach for operational
risk, for predominately fee-based financial organizations with a bank
component that subjects them to Basel II, an alternative is to allow
them to use the AMA for operational risk and an optional credit
55. Letter from Members of the House Committee on Financial Services to Alan
Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board, John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Donald E. Powell, Chairman, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, James E. Gilleran, Director, Office of Thrift
Supervision at 7-8 (Nov. 3, 2003), http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/
ANPR%20Comment-001.pdf..
56. See Letter from Financial Guardian Group to the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal





approach where credit risk is not the business driver. 8 For example,
they could use the AMA for operational risk and Basel I (or
Standardized-IRB) for credit exposure. This credit alternative would
be a much simpler, less costly approach for these institutions and
more consistent and in line with the low credit exposure in their
portfolios. Even if there were alternative options, under the ANPR
the great majority of U.S. banks will remain under Basel I, unless
they choose to opt-in to the New Accord.
I. Corporate Governance and Management Structure
The bank regulatory agencies, "in both the Advanced-IRB
and AMA, propose extensive new requirements for banks' corporate
structure and management."59 "The highly prescriptive structure of
the agencies' proposal provides little flexibility in establishing an
internal risk management structure best suited to a bank's particular
needs." 6 The agencies place "inappropriate and unduly burdensome
responsibilities on a bank's board of directors" and fail to "clearly
delineate the respective responsibilities of the board and senior
management. ' '61 Moreover, based on an analysis of banks regulatory
rules and statutes, the board of directors of a bank or parent holding
company has been assigned some type of new, Basel II-related
responsibility in over 200 instances.
"As proposed by the agencies, the responsibilities imposed on
the board of directors are excessively detailed, and go well beyond a
board's appropriate supervisory and strategic role. 62 For example,
the ANPR requires the board to:
maintain "effective internal controls over the banking
organization's information systems and processes for
assessing adequacy of regulatory capital and determining
regulatory capital charges, 63
58. As proposed, those using the AMA must also use the Advanced-IRB
approach. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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" approve all "significant aspects of the rating and
estimation processes, '1 64 and
* "ensure that appropriate resources have been allocated to
support the operational risk framework.,
6
1
" The ANPR also requires the board or a committee of the
board to "oversee the development of the firm-wide
operational risk framework.,
66
The board of directors' role in the risk management process
should be supervisory, focusing on the oversight of management's
activities and broad supervision of the implementation of regulatory
requirements. The board should not be charged with the
responsibility for the day-to-day risk management function of a bank.
The board of any banking organization is unlikely to be comprised of
directors with the time or skill set required to carry out the highly
technical and extensive requirements proposed by the agencies. The
unintended consequence of placing excessively detailed demands on
the board will mean less board resources, time, and attention devoted
to broader supervisory, strategic, and risk management
responsibilities.67
In addition to these broader concerns related to the proper
role of the board of directors, the proposed rules do not sufficiently
delineate the separate responsibilities of the board of directors and
senior management. Many of the requirements proposed by the
agencies impose duties on the board and management combined, but
do not specifically allow for division of responsibility between these
two groups. These requirements do not provide sufficient guidance
for the board to determine the extent to which it needs to be
involved. For example, it is unclear if the mere approval by the board
of funding to support an operational risk framework is sufficient to
fulfill its responsibilities, or if the board's responsibilities can only be
64. Id.
65. Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. at 45942.
66. Id.
67. Spina Letter, supra note 43.
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met through extensive development of detailed plans, policies, and
budgets.68
[The bank regulatory] agencies should revise the ANPR to
more closely align any new board responsibilities with the board's
strategic and oversight roles, to avoid placing management functions
on the board, to provide for clearer delineation of board and
management responsibilities, and, when appropriate, to allow board
delegations of its responsibilities to either board committees or senior
management.69
J. Congressional Reaction
Congress has held a series of hearings on Basel II, most
recently on June 18, 2003 (by the Senate Banking Committee) 70 and
June 19, 2003 (by the House Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit Subcommittee of the Financial Services Committee). 7' The
hearings also encompassed a review of operational risk under Basel
II. In a November 3, 2003 letter to the Federal bank regulators on
the ANPR, the House Committee on Financial Services' key
committee and subcommittee chairmen and ranking minority
members stated they had concerns about the major competitive and
market structure issues raised by Basel II and the ANPR.72 Their
letter also stated that "Basel II should be reviewed by Congress prior
to any final agreement that would affect U.S. and U.S.-based
financial institutions in such a significant manner. 7 3 Such a
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. A Review of the New Basel Capital Accord: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (June 18, 2003),
http://banking.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Detail&HearinglD=42.
71. The New Basel Accord - In Search of a Unified U.S. Position: Hearing Before
the House Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Comm. On Fin.
Services, 108th Cong. (June 19, 2003), http://financialservices.house.gov/
hearings.asp?formmode=detail&hearing=236.
72. Letter from Members of the House Committee on Financial Services to Alan
Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board, John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Donald E. Powell, Chairman, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, James E. Gilleran, Director, Office of Thrift
Supervision (Nov. 3, 2003), http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/
ANPR%20Comment_001.pdf.
73. Id. at 12.
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Congressional review would be analogous to the review of a trade
agreement or treaties which define the relationships between the U.S.
and foreign countries.74 In this case, Basel II and the ANPR set forth
relationships between how U.S. and foreign financial institutions are
supervised on a global level.75
K. Further Basel II and ANPR Concerns
The ANPR and Basel II still apply a floor even on institutions
that meet the difficult standards to qualify for AMA and Advanced-
IRB, because they would be required to hold no less than 90% of
their current Basel I capital levels in the first year after
implementation and no less that 80% in the second year. This creates
limited incentive for low-risk institutions to make the significant
investments in all of the Basel II models, particularly for those that
would see an increase in their capital charge. Also, they must re-
qualify and be recertified by the regulators in year three for the
advanced treatment under the ANPR if the limits on Basel II
recognition are dropped going forward. In addition, much more
easily quantified risks such as interest-rate risk, liquidity risk and
foreign exchange risk are not included as a new capital charge in the
ANPR.
IV. CONCLUSION
As proposed, the New Accord and the ANPR seek a more
risk sensitive approach to determining capital charges. Previously
unrecognized, the New Accord and ANPR would account for
operational risk. Given the high thresholds to be considered a "core
bank" subject to mandatory application of the ANPR, most U.S.
banks will escape application of the capital rules for operational risk.
The concerns addressed in this article might indicate many U.S.
banks would decline to opt-in to this regulatory regime, but I assume
almost all of the banks over $50 billion in assets will eventually
choose to become subject to Basel II.
74. See id.
75. Id.
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